Coinbase urges bitcoin to prepare for quantum computers now: what it proposes

What Coinbase proposed

On October 13, 2026, Coinbase published a post on its blog about how to prepare bitcoin together for the post-quantum era. The main point: moving bitcoin to signatures that can withstand quantum computers will take years, so the work has to start now, long before anyone announces a working machine.

This voice carries extra weight. Coinbase holds about 5% of all bitcoin in existence on behalf of its clients, including banks, asset managers and hedge funds. If the network ever has to change its signatures, Coinbase will also have to move all those coins to new addresses.

The company itself stresses that the threat is not here yet. No quantum computer capable of breaking bitcoin keys exists today. As CoinDesk reports, citing Google researchers, such a machine could appear by 2029. That is a forecast, not a date, but as Coinbase points out, changing bitcoin's rules and moving the whole ecosystem also takes years.

Why a quantum computer threatens keys

Bitcoin is protected by elliptic curve signatures: ECDSA and Schnorr. A regular computer cannot work out a private key from a public key. A powerful enough quantum computer running Shor's algorithm could, in theory, do exactly that.

What matters is where the public key is already visible. As long as nothing has been sent from a regular address, the blockchain only stores a hash of the key. After the first spend, the key becomes public for good. With the oldest P2PK outputs and with Taproot addresses (bc1p), the key is visible from the start. We explained how the formats differ in our guide to bitcoin address types, and how many coins already sit on exposed keys in the article on Europol's quantum warning and "bunker mode".

Coinbase's six recommendations

Coinbase does not offer a finished upgrade and does not name any deadlines. Its post describes what the transition should look like so that nothing gets lost along the way.

1. Separate the "container" from the signature. The transaction format should be built so that new post-quantum signatures can be added and swapped without rebuilding the system. As examples of this kind of flexibility, Coinbase names the P2MR (BIP-360) and P2TRv2 proposals.
2. Protect in stages. Active wallets should be given a way to switch to post-quantum or hybrid signatures before the network decides what to do with old formats. One option is a "1-of-2" setup, where coins can be spent either with today's ECDSA or Schnorr key or with a post-quantum one.
3. Be careful with stateful signatures. Some schemes require the wallet to remember which one-time keys it has already used. Restore an old backup or lose that state, and a key may get used twice, which opens the door to a forged signature. If bitcoin supports such schemes, stateless ones should be available next to them.
4. Reliable implementations. Software should verify signatures the same way on every platform, should not leak secrets through computation time, and should stay safe even if the random number generator fails during signing.
5. MPC compatibility. Large custodians split a key among several participants so that no single person or device ever holds all of it. At least one of the new signature options should work well in that setup too.
6. A path for latecomers. If the network ever restricts spending from ECDSA and Schnorr keys, it is worth planning in advance how holders of old formats can move their coins to protected addresses.

Coinbase lists these signature candidates: ML-DSA, SLH-DSA, FN-DSA and SHRINCS, a hash-based scheme. The US NIST approved the first two as standards in 2024, and the FN-DSA standard is still in the works.

What to do about dormant coins

This is the hardest question. Old addresses hold coins that have not moved for years, including coins whose owners lost their keys long ago. If a quantum computer shows up, those coins will most likely be the first target. Coinbase warns that such a machine could be built in secret and used to drain these wallets before the public even learns it exists.

Coinbase does not say what should happen to those coins. Its position is that the topic can and should be discussed, but alongside the technical work, not instead of it. And any mechanism for "rescuing" old coins must itself resist quantum attacks, or thieves will use it, and a single exposed public key will be enough for them.

What this means for bitcoin holders today

You do not need to move your coins today: bitcoin has no post-quantum addresses yet, so there is nowhere to move them. Still, a few habits are useful right now.

• Do not reuse addresses. Use a new address for every incoming payment, and your wallet will show you one. For bc1q, 1 and 3 addresses that have never spent anything, the key stays hidden behind a hash; with Taproot (bc1p), it is visible from the start.
• Know where your coins are. If your bitcoin sits on an exchange or with a custodian, they will handle the move to new addresses. If it is in your own wallet, one day you will have to move the coins yourself, and you will need your seed phrase and access to the wallet for that.
• Follow the news about BIP-360. For now, it is a draft proposal with no activation date. If and when the new address type goes live on the network, holders will have time to move, but not unlimited time.

Other networks are getting ready faster. Zcash promises post-quantum signatures as early as January, and TRON has enabled them on its testnet. Bitcoin makes decisions more slowly, and that is exactly why Coinbase is asking to start now.

How to exchange bitcoin without registration and keep your own keys

The quantum threat is about keys, and the keys belong to whoever holds the coins. If you want to decide for yourself when and where to move your bitcoin, keep it in your own wallet and swap it through a crypto exchange that does not need an account from you.

At VertEXchange, you do not need an account, email or phone number to exchange. You enter your own address, see the rate and the amount before sending, and the coins go straight to that address. This way you can buy bitcoin with ether to your own wallet or, if you want to keep part of your savings in a coin that promises new signatures sooner, exchange bitcoin to Zcash without registration.

• A fixed rate holds for about 15 minutes.
• VertEXchange does not hold customer coins: the payout goes to your address.
• If the exchange does not go through, the coins go back to the refund address.
• Personal fields of an operation are deleted 24 hours after it is completed.
• Support chat is available on every page, and issues are handled by exchange code.

FAQ

What did Coinbase propose on October 13, 2026?

To start preparing bitcoin for quantum computers now: build in a flexible format for new signatures, give wallets "1-of-2" hybrid protection and discuss the fate of dormant coins separately. The post contains no finished upgrade and no deadlines.

Can a quantum computer break bitcoin today?

No. Such a machine does not exist yet, and Coinbase says plainly that the threat belongs to the future. As CoinDesk reports, citing Google researchers, it could appear by 2029.

What is BIP-360?

A proposal for a new output type in bitcoin, P2MR. Coinbase cites it as an example of a format that post-quantum signatures could be added to. It is a proposal, not an adopted upgrade.

Do I need to move my bitcoin to a new address right now?

No, there are no post-quantum addresses on the network yet. For now, it helps not to reuse addresses and to know where your seed phrase is kept, so you can move later without a rush.

Why does Coinbase's opinion matter so much?

Coinbase holds about 5% of all bitcoin. If the network changes its signatures, it will have to move a huge amount of client coins, so developers take its requirements for new schemes into account.

Which bitcoin addresses are vulnerable to a quantum attack?

Those whose public key is visible on the blockchain: old P2PK outputs, Taproot addresses and any addresses that have already sent coins. For untouched bc1q, 1 and 3 addresses, the key is hidden behind a hash.